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The Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern African States (PTA) 
groups 16 members1 with one accession under negotiation (Angola) and 
another under sporadic discussion (Botswana). It stretches from Ethiopia 
in the North to Lesotho in the South and Mauritius in the East to_ Angola in 
the West. The PTA Treaty provides for expansion to contiguous states 
(under which provision Burundi and Rwanda became members) and there has 
been some consideration of applying this provision in the cases of Zaire 
and the Sudan. Madagascar is included in the PTA Area and-was a party to 
negotiation of the Tteaty but has not become a member. Mozambique's 
accession becomes effective in 1990 so that as of 1989 membership was 
effectively 15.
The PTA Treaty dates to 1982. However, negotiations eventually leading to 
PTA date to the latter half of the 1960s. Similarly, while the PTA had 
nominally been in. existence for slightly over seven years as of 1 January 
1990 effective implementation has been largely in the last two years.
In the mid-1960s the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) as 
part of its continental strategy for economic integration instituted talks 
among the independent Eastern and Southern African States (including the 
Indian Ocean island states) toward forming an economic community. These 
were in fact overtaken in 1977-78 by the renegotiation of the East African 
Community and were dormant until after its 1987 back-up. The EAC and its 
member states in the early 1970s entered into negotiations with Zambia, 
Burundi, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Somalia on expanding EAC albeit only the 
Zambian negotiations ever reached a detailed stage. The economic crises 
from 1973-4 and, in particular, the weakening of the EAC put an end to this 
endeavour.
2From 1987-88 the ECA again instituted talks among the independent states 
which speedily began the process of Treaty drafting, resulting - after 
protracted negotiations - in the 1982 Treaty. In parallel the independent 
Southern African States over 1979-80 had negotiated the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference2, a body with parallel, partially 
overlapping but potentially supportive and complementary goals.
The PTA Treaty is one of the new wave of South economic integration 
approaches modelled on the EEC Treaties (and the Andean Pact's Cartagena 
Treaty).3 It, therefore, goes well beyond establishment of a common market 
and of trade liberalisation per se in its aims. This approach - based on 
the limited success and applicability limitations of simple Common Market 
approaches based in the Viner-Meade second best neo-classical trade theory 
constructs - included attention to clearing of payments and to monetary 
union; to non-physical (i.e. regulatory) barriers to transport of goods and 
to transport and communication as such; to coordination and specialisation 
in industry, agriculture and training and to development and trade finance 
institution creation and funding.
PTA has a strong central secretariat in charge of all programme areas and, 
in practice, providing most detailed proposals and supervising their 
implementation when adopted. This has become somewhat blurred because the 
transit traffic documentation harmonisation exercise has been serviced by 
the UNCTAD unit based in Nairobi and the Central"1 and Northern55 Corridor 
transport groupings pre-date PTA and have basically member government 
programme initiation, articulation and implementation. Government 
implementation of agreed decisions and involvement in programme operation 
between major meetings has been uneven, often lagged and frequently weak.
The PTA's main foci of effort have been:
1. negotiating and putting into operation preferential tariffs on a 
"common list";
2. reducing non-tariff import constraints;
3. establishing a clearing union for regional transactions paralleled by
a regional traveller's cheque;
4. seeking to articulate steps toward a monetary union;
35. reducing non-physical transport barriers including trade 
classification systems, transit traffic documentation and interstate 
third party insurance over;
6. coordinating and developing better multi-model transport links among 
PTA states;
7. increasing domestic/regional share of benefits of regional trade 
expansion by limiting preferences to enterprises with 
domestic/regional equity, board member and senior manager majorities;
8. devising effective programmes to coordinate production as a means to 
specialisation and expansion of trade in other sectors - especially 
manufacturing and agriculture;
9. mobilising financial resources to enhance trade and develop relevant 
infrastructure and production units preferably via some form of 
regional trade and development bank.
This was and is an ambitious agenda. Until late 1987 it was one on which 
even the Secretary General viewed progress as minimal. As of 1990 the late 
1987 reading looks too negative - the "common list" for reduced duties 
(including its first extension of coverage) had in fact been negotiated and 
- as can now be seen - were in the process of adoption. Similarly, the 
Clearing House for intra-regional payments was in operation even though at 
that point in time handling under a quarter of such transactions.
Similarly, the negotiations in respect to trade classification, 
documentation and transit traffic regulation had begun in earnest even if 
the main results came in 1988-89.
Results are uneven but in several foci significant. A "Common List" of 
over 700 commodities to which preferential tariffs apply exists with the 
second expansion taking it to this number to be effective in 1990. Four 
countries*5 are exempt from giving preferences, twov are apparently giving 
preferences but have not published schedules, one® is a new member still 
preparing its schedule.
In respect to non-tariff barriers the problem has at the formal level been 
that those covered by the Treaty (e.g. foreign exchange deposits and taxes, 
quotas, import bans) are uncommon while those which are widespread® - 
import licensing and foreign exchange allocation - are not explicitly
4covered in the Treaty. The substantive problem is the foreign exchange 
constraints facing thirteen of PTA's members and in particular the eleven10 
of them who have reason to believe special foreign exchange allocations to, 
or open general licence for PTA exports would worsen their trade balance 
position within PTA without significantly reducing extra-regional imports.
Limited, negotiated special allocations of foreign exchange/import licenses 
for PTA goods are being negotiated and - to a limited extent - do exist via 
inter central bank swing credits. Surprisingly - given PTA's earlier 
ringing denunciations - some form of counter trade (frame trade agreement) 
is being explored as a route to trade expansion.
The Clearing House for intra-PTA transactions has been in existence for 
eight years and now handles almost 75% of trade transactions.11 This is a 
turnover of the order of $1,000 million a year including both sides of each 
transaction. Perhaps more strikingly the proportion covered by cross­
cancellation of credits and debits has risen to 59% with only 41% settled 
in hard currency. The PTA Travellers Cheque has gained acceptability in 
most member countries with turnover of about $40 million a year.12
Progress toward a monetary union has been negligible. The problems created 
by inconvertible currencies - or more accurately detailed foreign exchange 
allocations - and of widely varying degrees of overvaluation are 
recognised. One means of eliminating them would be a monetary union (with 
or without a common currency but with a regional accounting unit such as 
UAPTA) combined with no exchange controls on regional visible and invisible 
trade transactions.13 However, the underlying foreign exchange problems 
which give rise to overvaluation and detailed foreign exchange 
control/import licensing have to date prevented articulation of a viable 
route, much less serious negotiations on its adoption.1"1
Non-physical transport barrier reduction has proceeded on a broad front and 
relatively rapidly. Common transit traffic documentation and regional 
("yellow card") third party vehicle insurance are both negotiated and in 
force in most PTA members. Standardisation of trade (and therefore 
customs) categories and procedures is largely negotiated and in force in a 
minority of states. A common road toll ($4 per 100 kilometres for heavy 
lorries) for non-national PTA vehicles has been negotiated and is due to 
take effect in 1990.
5Transport has seen a substantial amount of discussion but relatively little 
PTA regional strategic design or priority setting much less coordinated 
fund raising or implementation.1 !>
The Northern and central corridor routes from Mombassa and Dar es Salaam to 
Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi (plus Zaire) are exceptions to this 
generalisation as, of course, is the SATCC strategy and programme with over 
$1,000 million invested since 1980. However, all three relate to distinct 
sub-groups of states not to the whole PTA regions. In practice all three 
are conducted outside PTA by the states directly concerned albeit the 
Corridor Authority cases do appear to liaise with PTA rather more than does 
SATCC (and vice versa).
The regulations governing eligibility for preferences by limiting extra- 
regional participation borrowed from the Andean Pact's Cartagena Treaty 
have proved troublesome. They were initially held in abeyance to give time 
for regionalisation. By the mid-1980s it became evident that several 
significant states - notably Kenya, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Mauritius could 
not meet the deadline. Interim provisions providing partial preferences 
even in cases of over 50% extra regional equity ownership, board membership 
or senior managerial provision were approved. However, this appears to 
have postponed rather than resolved the problem. Given the increased 
interest in foreign enterprise partners/investers by almost all PTA 
members; the reluctance of many large external enterprises to hold minority 
stakes; and the probability that ventures in new products or product fields 
(the ones perhaps most likely to give priority to regional marketing) are 
likely to have an initial foreign senior managerial majority it is hard to 
see how the 50% rule can ever be brought into force on an across the board 
basis.
Industrial and agricultural coordination have received attention but still 
lack strategies and articulated priorities beyond a cluster of proposed 
large scale industrial sector studies. In 1990 a metallurgical technology 
institute and related training programme serving the region will come into 
being. These are interesting because they appear to represent initiatives 
proposed, carried to adoption and largely funded by a member state, i.e. 
Zimbabwe. In 1989 PTA began to work toward elaborating human health 
programmes centred on drug procurement, production, regional trade and 
standardisation/quality control.
6PTA has in the past stated its objections to begging for foreign finance - 
indeed arguably this has limited the enthusiasm for developing coordinated 
project priorities at regional level. However, it has in fact concentrated 
substantial attention on efforts to create a PTA Development and Trade 
Finance Financial Institution. The initial efforts were to expand the 
membership of the then moribund East African Development Bank - one of the 
EAC survivors16*. However, in the mid-1980s EADB's three members chose to 
revive its operations on a continued Kenya-Uganda-Tanzania basis. A PTA 
Trade and Development Bank was then promoted, negotiated and, indeed, 
formally established. However, both the absence of significant external 
pledges and problems in securing member capital subscriptions have 
prevented its substantive operation.
In 1988-89 PTA has altered its approach to financial mobilisation. It now 
appears to envisage a strategy of coordinated sectoral project lists at 
regional level, a technical capacity for bringing them to 'saleable' form 
(backed by a $3.4 million ADB grant toward a Projects Preinvestment Unit) 
and mobilising/coordinating external financing for these projects. This 
appears to be a response to two developments:
1. the evident preference of most external grant and - especially - loan 
providers for dealing with coordinated or multi-country projects 
directly rather than via sub-regional financial institutions;
2. the success of SADCC in mobilising external resources for prioritised 
regional project programmes in several sectors.
In this respect it will be interesting to see whether the PTA becomes the 
coordinating vehicle for EEC regional fund allocations in the non-SADCC PTA 
Members (as SADCC has been for its members since 1985). Some problems of 
different PTA and EEC definitions of regional boundaries exist but should 
not prove insuperable.
Since PTA's central concern has been to expand regional trade - or more 
exactly to reduce the extra regional import content and therefore 
dependence on external assistance1"7 of regional economic growth - the 
simple test of its success might seem to be intra-PTA trade growth.
However, this test cannot be taken very seriously at the present time 
because only in 1988 and 1989 have enough preferential provisions been 
operating to give any real cause to believe trade expansion is
7consequential on them. Arguably the growth of a less national and more 
regional outlook in member states of PTA and of SADCC is relevant as is 
transport improvement in both cases but quantification is well nigh 
impossible.
Certainly intra-PTA exports rose 66% over 1985-88 to $569 million and 
imports 78% to $636 million - an average of 72%1S versus 40% and 43% 
respectively for global exports and imports - an average of 42%. This does 
represent a reversal of a 20% fall over 1980-85 (paralleling a 27% fall in 
global external trade). However, it began in 1984-5 before it is credible 
to cite PTA as a significant cause. Nevertheless, PTA has operated in a 
context of increasing intra-regional trade and contributed to greater 
national attention to sustaining and speeding up that expansion.
Certain central problems affect PTA's future degree of success. To pose 
the issue in those terms is in itself a judgement - in respect to the 
Western and Central African Economic Communities (and to PTA in 1987) the 
question is whether they have a meaningful future. These include:
1. national concentration on expanding exports and import substitution
with little (or negative) attention to expanding regional imports;
2. severe regional and global trade imbalances which to date have
prevented significant advances in preferential import or foreign 
exchange licensing;
3. the isolation of the three northernmost PTA members (in terms of
transport links and of trade) from the others;
4. the cost of war $60 million over 1980-88 by UN estimates for the
SADCC nine (about $30,000 million for present PTA members) from South 
African destabilisation and aggression; perhaps $7,500 million from 
civil war in Uganda19 and at least $15,000 million from civil and 
inter-state wars in the Horn20 - is a major drag on a majority of 
Eastern and Southern African economies in respect to market and 
production growth and to foreign exchange availability. While there 
are good prospects for its reduction in the Southern African and 
Uganda cases those in the Horn remain problematic and the 
rehabilitation of war damaged economies and livelihoods will stretch 
into the next century;
85. PTA's organisational and operational structure is not perceived as
involving governments on an ongoing basis leading to a real danger of 
their seeing regionalism as "them" not "us" and as antagonistic to 
"us" when entailing costs;21
6. Trade centred regionalism has inadequate political sex appeal to
workers and to politicians who care more immediately about employment 
and production;22
7. which combines with PTA's past low levels of external resource
mobilisation for
intra-PTA/inter-state projects and/or trade finance to limit the degree of 
enthusiasm and priority accorded to it by its member states.23
Two other reasons often cited as constraining PTA are not cited here: low 
regional growth rates and PTA/SADCC rivalry.
PTA regional growth after 1985 appears to have been about equal to 
population growth - well above SSA as a whole and a reversal of sharp 1980- 
85 per capita declines. Excluding war affiliated economies it appears as 
of 1979-80 to be above 4%. While not optimal such rates are not such as to 
block production and trade expansion and restructuring. Furthermore, in 
the context of slow but positive per capita GDP growth constrained by 
import capacity the need to reduce extra-regional imports coefficients 
remains high while the ability to act on that need is higher than in a 
crisis of rapidly falling per capita (or even absolute) GDP.
PTA/SADCC relations to date have been largely verbal. While initial 
presentational and personnel problems rendered them tense over 1979-85 the 
climate has improved markedly since then. In practice SADCC's successes 
have been in sectors or toward objectives not central to actual PTA 
activities and vice versa. In prospect there appear to be more 
opportunities for coordination and specialisation than for mutually 
damaging clashes - especially if all SADCC states become PTA members as 
seems increasingly likely.
9These problematics and the prospects for overcoming them in the 1990s will 
be addressed in more detail in the trade policy inter-organisational and 
concluding sections.
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II.
The Economic Structures of PTA's Members
The 1989 population of the PTA's present member states is almost 150 
million, regional GDP about $55,000 million and GDP/capita about $275. If 
Namibia, Angola and Botswana join these will rise to over 160 million, 
nearly $62,500 and about $325 respectively. External trade in 1988 
totalled $18,000 for 15 PTA members (excluding Mozambique) and was of the 
order of $25,000 million for the 19 (34% and 41% of GDP respectively).
These data suggest a substantial potential regional market for almost all 
industrial sectors and most products. The most evident exceptions are high 
priced consumer hard goods including automobiles (small upper-middle and 
upper income group) and specialised intermediate and capital goods (overall 
market size). In many cases technological and personnel capacity would 
appear to be a more binding immediate constraint than regional market size 
(abstracting from import licensing and exchange controls).
The regional data aggregate economies of very different size, output, 
economic structures and degree of dilapidation or good working order. The 
smallest state - Comoros - has a population of under 50,000 while Ethiopia 
and Tanzania have populations exceeding 25 million and together with 
Mozambique and Kenya account for over half the population of the PTA.
GDP ranges from nearly $6,000 million in the case of Zimbabwe to under $50 
million in the case of the Comoros. Mauritius GDP per capita exceeds 
$1,000 while those of Ethiopia, Mozambique, Malawi, Tanzania, Rwanda, 
Burundi and Uganda are just above or just below $200.
The impact of war has been very unequal. In the cases of Mozambique, 
Uganda, Ethiopia and Somalia war costs and production dislocation including 
physical destruction have been massive. In those of Malawi and Somalia 
there have been massive refugee flows. Zimbabwe, Zambia and Tanzania have 
had to meet very heavy defence bills and - in the first two cases as well 
as that of Malawi, massive excess transport costs as a result of the 
destruction of their natural routes to Mozambican ports. Lesotho and 
Swaziland have had rather lower costs; Djibouti has been affected as a 
transit/entrepot economy by the debilitation of the Ethiopian economy; 
while Kenya and Mauritius have had no significant war costs.
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The economies with the most deferred maintenance and debilitation of fixed 
investment are Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda, Somalia and Ethiopia 
while the capital stock of Zimbabwe, Kenya and Mauritius is relatively well 
maintained and more up to date.
Fourteen of the sixteen PTA members have basically agricultural economies - 
the exceptions being Djibouti (entrepot) and Lesotho (migrant worker 
remittances). Of these, twelve produce primarily domestic food with the 
exception being Mauritius (sugar, tea) and Swaziland (sugar, citrus, beef, 
pulpwood). In the late 1980s the PTA region had a food deficit of about 2 
million tonnes. However, excluding war ravaged Mozambique and Ethiopia it 
had a surplus, albeit only because low entitlements reduced the effective 
demand for food. Again, excluding Ethiopia and Mozambique the growth trend 
of food production is over 3% and possibly 3.5% - up on earlier estimates 
because the first half of the 1980s was particularly drought afflicted. 
Individually Burundi, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe are normally wholly or virtually self-sufficient in basic food 
production (Zimbabwe and - excluding refugees - have structural surpluses) 
while Somalia's sugar, grain and vegetable oil imports are more than 
balanced by livestock exports. The Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Lesotho, 
Mauritius and Mozambique have structural food deficits. Those of the 
Comoros, Djibouti and Lesotho are ecologically and environmentally 
determined while those of Mauritius and Swaziland turn on the high 
proportion of export agriculture. Mozambique's deficit is a pure war 
effect while in the case of Ethiopia war has greatly exacerbated an 
underlying ecological/environmental problem.
The domestic food production sub-sector is characterised by relatively to 
very low productivity. In part this is ecological but it also relates to 
low levels of tested, applicable knowledge; poor supporting services and 
infrastructure and low levels of inputs. The productivity in the export 
sector is somewhat higher but several major exports (coffee, sugar, tea, 
cotton, tobacco and sisal) face very poor prospects in terms of world price 
trends. Beef and sheep market access for increased volumes at remunerative 
prices is problematic while in the main producing areas cashew nuts 
(Southern Tanzania) and cloves (Zanzibar region of Tanzania) face disease 
problems uncontrollable and certainly incurable with present knowledge.
The most promising exports are citrus and horticulture (including flowers).
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These are, however, significant for only one economy (Swaziland) in the 
citrus case and two (Kenya, Zimbabwe) in the horticultural.
Industrial activity is very unevenly distributed absolutely and relative to 
GDP. The two dominant poles are Kenya and Zimbabwe (in which, including 
agricultural processing, its contribution is larger than that of 
agriculture on a national accounting prices basis). Mauritius has a 
flourishing global export oriented manufacturing sector (as does Botswana 
among potential members). Malawi Tanzania, Mozambique and Uganda (and 
among potential members, Angola) have substantial nominal industrial 
capacity but it is - except for Malawi - both dilapidated and producing at 
perhaps one-third rated capacity as a result of general economic malaise 
and of war costs and foreign exchange shortages in particular.
Historically Kenya, Zimbabwe, Mauritius and, to a degree, Malawi, have had 
export oriented sectors.
The industrial products of the sixteen are by no means identical - 
substantial matches of intra-regional capacity in excess of production and 
extra-regional imports do exist. While the dominant sub-sector of 
manufacturing is mass market necessity and amenity consumer goods (e.g. 
textiles, flour, beer, cigarettes) this can be overstated. There is 
substantial intermediate (e.g. paper, light engineering) and construction 
materials (e.g. cement, metal rods) production. Capital goods production - 
beyond light engineering and heavy maintenance - is limited but Zimbabwe is 
a partial general exception while rolling stock production in Zimbabwe (and 
potentially Mozambique) and electricity distribution and switchgear 
production in Tanzania are examples of internationally (e.g. on open tender 
aid contracts) competitive capital goods niches. In general the operating 
(raw materials, intermediates, spares) import cost is of the order of 25% 
to 30% which is fairly low by global standards. However that of industrial 
sector plant and machinery and construction materials/specialist 
contractors probably exceeds 75% (including import content of local 
purchases) except in Zimbabwe.
Transport and communications infrastructure nationally range from good 
(Mauritius) through fair (Kenya, Zimbabwe) to poor and abominable 
(Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique). In the last three cases 
this is largely the result of general economic malaise and war costs on 
maintenance (plus massive sabotage in the Mozambique case).
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Regional transport and communications routes are in very uneven condition 
and have significant limitation in the North-South direction. The SADCC 
states now have relatively good regional communications and if war and 
foreign exchange constraints permit will have a reasonably complete sub­
regional transport grid on completion of ongoing rehabilitation projects. 
The Northern and Central Corridor transport links will also be adequate 
once present rehabilitation and capacity building projects are complete.
The Djibouti-Ethiopia road and, especially rail routes, are in very poor 
condition. The SADCC-Central PTA transport routes via Tanzania and Kenya 
are perhaps adequate but in a somewhat doubtful state of repair while those 
from Central PTA to the Horn are non-existent. Coastal interstate and 
mainland-island shipping capacity is low and services erratic. Air 
communication, however, is relatively good and improving with the exception 
of access to and from Somalia.
The external balance position of all PTA members except Mauritius is 
precarious. The visible trade imbalance of the 15 PTA states (excluding 
Mozambique) was $4,250 million (over $5,000 million including Mozambique) 
and has increased fairly steadily absolutely (from $1,675 million) and as a 
percentage of exports (42% to 62%) since 1975.
In fact the trade deficit understates external balance constraints on 
output. At least thirteen PTA economies24 are import constrained and 
five25 import starved in respect to production.
Overall, lumping visible and invisible trade, debt services, remittances 
and overseas development assistance (aid), the external balance of only one 
PTA member - Mauritius - is secure. For nine (Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Rwanda, Somalia,2fo Swaziland and Zimbabwe2"7) it is tight 
either because of substantial imbalance and/or substantial import shortage 
idled productive capacity. In six cases (Comoros, Ethiopia, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Mozambique, Uganda and Zambia23) it is disastrous.
Debt service actually paid is over 25% of exports in several cases but is 
not the primary external balance problem as the countries with the heaviest 
external debt/debt service burdens23 are combining rescheduling with de 
facto default.30
Arguably it is the external balance position not market limitations (even 
at present demand levels)31 which most severely constrain manufacturing
14
sector output. They are also the most severe barriers to regional trade 
liberalisation and - by preventing financing the foreign exchange cost of 
added regional market export - and regional trade expansion with or without 
additional liberalisation and preferences.
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III.
Levels, Trends and Structures of Intra-PTA Trade
The total level of intra-SADCC trade at $1,200 million in 1988 (imports 
plus exports) is significant. It represents a 72% increase over 1985s $700 
million which is very substantially in excess of the global trade growth of 
42% or of price inflation. At 7% of global trade it is not large'3'' but is 
well above the SSA average.
However, two factors raise doubts as to the impact of the PTA on these 
trends to date:
1. Overall imports from Africa have risen 71% (versus 66% from PTA 
members) and overall African imports 71% (versus 78% from PTA 
members) and total trade with non-PTA African states is $875 million 
($275 million exports and $600 million imports). At least half of 
this represents African oil imports (including some from potential 
member Angola) but it also includes the largest and most rapidly 
growing Eastern and Southern African two way trade - 
Zimbabwe/Botswana;
2. Trade patterns still focus on Zimbabwe (with Malawi and secondarily 
Mozambique and Zambia plus Botswana among potential members) and 
Kenya (with Uganda, Tanzania and secondarily Rwanda and Burundi 
excluding very substantial unrecorded trade with Somalia). These 
patterns date to the 1950s and were largely built by the East African 
Community, the Central African Federation and their predecessors.33
These patterns are both of gradual expansion and of continuity. The 
expansion appears to relate primarily to the rapid growth of the Botswana 
economy, the continued - albeit slow - growth of Malawi (until 1988), the 
partial recovery of Uganda and Tanzania's economies after 1984-85, the 
independence of Zimbabwe which made it a more acceptable trading partner 
and the resumption of normal economic relations between Kenya and Tanzania 
(disrupted in 1977-78 with the collapse of the East African Community). In 
the Southern African sub-region the greater regional consciousness and 
orientation resulting from SADCC clearly played a role while the continued 
recovery of Kenya-Tanzania trade presumably relates in part of PTA links in 
general. The continuity, as noted, centres on the continued polar roles of
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Zimbabwe and Kenya. However, it is not complete continuity. Mauritius has 
expanded its intra-regional trade while the rapid expansion of Zimbabwe- 
Botswana trade - at present still outside PTA - beyond the long-standing 
Botswana sugar imports, represents a substantial range of new products.
The 1985-88 regional trade expansion, as noted, followed a 20% nominal 
decline over 1980-85 and a nominal 1970-85 increase of 39% which was well 
below price increases and therefore represented a decline in volume terms. 
In 1970 intra-PTA economy trade stood at 9% of exports declining to 7% in 
1980 and 1985 before rising to 8% in 1988. On the import side the 
comparable percentages are 8%, 4%, 4% and 6%. The problem with 
interpreting this as the direct effect of economic regionalism is that non- 
PTA African3* market exports movement from 1% in 1970 to 5% in 1980, 4% in 
1985 and 4\% in 1988 and of imports from 3% in 1970 to 5% in 1980, 1985 and 
1988 is more sustained. Even excluding the role of oil price increases 
until 1980 there appears to be almost as rapid a growth of non-PTA African 
trade of PTA members as of PTA trade with Botswana and Zaire apparently the 
largest two partners.
Intra-PTA trade is relatively diversified but sharply divergent from that 
of global trade. The dominant components are manufactured goods, grain, 
sugar and metals. While in the cases of sugar and metals, intra-PTA 
exports are a small proportion of total exports in grain and manufactures, 
intra-PTA exports exceed non-PTA exports353 except for Mauritius which is 
primarily a European oriented export zone manufacturer and Swaziland, whose 
principal outlet for manufactures (currently dominated by Coca Cola syrup) 
is South Africa.
Metal exports to PTA members come primarily from Zambia (copper and lead) 
and Zimbabwe (iron and steel). In both cases they are a relatively small 
fraction of total metal exports (albeit a significant one for Zimbabwean 
iron and steel). Botswana-Zimbabwe trade includes substantial copper- 
nickel matte exports by Botswana, albeit for refining and re-export not 
Zimbabwean consumption.
Sugar is exported to PTA members by Malawi, Mauritius, Swaziland and 
Zimbabwe. However, in no case is it a substantial proportion of total 
sugar exports nor, except for Swaziland of total exports to PTA.
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Grain (maize) trade is very erratic turning on regional weather patterns 
and on availability of triangular food aid funding. The principal exporter 
is Zimbabwe which has a structural maize surplus but Malawi was also a 
regular exporter until the destruction of transport routes to Mozambican 
ports rendered sales (except peripherally to Tanzania and Zambia) 
uneconomic and the inflow of 700,000 Mozambican refugees created a domestic 
maize shortage. Zimbabwe's stable natural markets would appear to be 
Swaziland and Botswana but these are in fact largely supplied by South 
Africa. In practice triangular food aid procurement formerly for Zambia, 
recently for Malawi and from 1985 for Mozambique, is the dominant mechanism 
for Zimbabwe grain exports. Kenya has been a source of food aid maize 
exports to Somalia.
Manufactured goods exports come primarily from Zimbabwe and Kenya and 
secondarily from Mauritius and Malawi (plus Botswana). They are relatively 
diversified, with textiles and garments the largest single category. Light 
engineering products are also significant and capital equipment (e.g. 
Zimbabwean railway rolling stock and assembled lorries with not 
insignificant domestic content and Tanzanian electrical distribution and 
switchgear) are also present albeit still a low proportion of intra-PTA 
trade.
Structurally the PTA appears to have three present structural surplus 
states - Zimbabwe, Kenya and Mauritius. Each is a competitive manufactured 
goods exporter and the first two are also net regional food exporters.
Built-in structural regional trade deficits appear to be deep-rooted and 
not readily reducible in the cases of Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Rwanda, Somalia, Uganda and Zambia albeit Zambia export diversification, 
away from the declining copper-cobalt sector, to be successful must 
presumably centre in large part on manufacturing which might move it into 
balance. Cases of potential approximate balance on regional trade include 
Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland and Tanzania. However, to attain this, 
Mozambique and Tanzania would need to rehabilitate and raise capacity 
utilisation ratios in their manufacturing sectors (thereby increasing 
availability and cutting real unit costs). Malawi would need restoration 
of war-cut or crippled transport routes and Swaziland a re-orientation of 
its manufacturing for export focus from South Africa to the PTA region.
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Of the prospective members , Botswana and - less clearly - Angola, might 
have relatively high and balanced intra-PTA trade levels, and Namibia a 
structural deficit case unless its manufacturing sector develops along the 
lines of that of Botswana with Angola (in place of Zimbabwe for Botswana) 
its primary market.
Lesotho - because it is South Africa locked, and relatively distant form 
other PTA members and potential members, has negligible imports from the 
region. As its visible exports cover barely a tenth of visible imports its 
PTA regional exports are, not surprisingly, still more insignificant.
Intra-PTA trade could probably treble on the basis of existing productive 
capacity and extra regional importation of goods potentially competitively 
available in the region. However, additional "common list" coverage and 
higher preference margins are unlikely to have much impact unless several 
other (and arguably more important barriers) are tackled effectively at the 
same time:
1. improvement of land, sea and air cargo transport in respect both to
speed of delivery and of real cost reduction;
2. preferential liberalisation of import licensing and foreign exchange
allocation regionally - with or without counter trade and frame trade
agreement safeguards;3&
3. provision of export credit;3'
4. reduction of unit costs in those manufacturing industries now plagued
by debilitation and low capacity utilisation;
5. either realignment of exchange rates (to reduce divergences in degree
of overvaluation significantly) or export subsidies on a substantial 
scale;30
6. broadening and deepening of regional business information networks
and of regional orientation - especially in sourcing.
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TABLE 1
INTRA-PTA TRADE: EXPORTS
IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
Coen try 1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988
BURUNDI 0.6 0.7 1.1 7.4 8.5 3.0 4.2
COMOROS 0.4 0.5 1.3 0.4
DJIBOUTI 6.1 14.4 19.1 20.7
ETHIOPIA 0.8 31.0 49.7 13.0 14.1 16.7 19.9
RENTA 111.9 185.0 279.7 179.0 183.2 222.4 250.7
LESOTHO
MALAWI 1.7 13.1 22.2 25.4 13.5 12.1 17.7
MAURITIUS 0.7 3.0 2.2 1.3 2.5 3.2
RUANDA 18.9 0.2 57.6 3.7 4.4 119.1 90.1
SOMALIA 0.7 2.5 1.0 0.3 1.1 1.1 1.4
SWAZILAND
TANZANIA 42.3 55.5 28.1 8.5 7.4 7.5 9.7
UGANDA 36.9 6.3 5.9 4.0 4.1 4.7 5.9
ZAMBIA 6.2 9.6 17.5 26.2 47.9 44.2 42.6
ZIMBABWE 66.5 61.8 83.6 102.8
TOTAL 220.1 304.6 465.9 342.7 362.1 537.4 569.2
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbooks,1970- 1989.
INTRA-PTA TRADE 
IN MILLIONS OF
: IMPORTS 
DOLLARS
TABLE 2
Country 1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 , 1987 1988
BURUNDI 1.9 2.7 13.8 18.2 18.4 24.8 23.1
COMOROS 4.2 3.9 5.1 5.5
DJIBOUTI 16.6 18.0 21.6 25.9
ETHIOPIA 4.1 5.6 10.9 5.8 6.3 7.3 8.8
KENYA 46.2 36.8 23.3 15.8 22.0 154.5 125.7
LESOTHO
MALAWI 3.3 36.3 26.4 23.0 16.7 24.8 35.4
MAURITIUS 6.8 24.9 8.5 7.1 8.9 8.5
RWANDA 5.1 13.0 32.5 41.6 43.1 50.5 47.6
SOMALIA 3.6 11.0 28.3 15.0 18.1 22.6 27.2
SWAZILAND
TAnZAN1A 47.9 61.6 14.6 35.5 33.8 40.6 46.8
UGANDA 51.5 67.5 202.1 112.6 122.1 141.4 169.5
ZAMBIA 23.1 20.1 26.5 33.2 44.6 51.3 75.2
2IKEASUE 26.5 33.8
%
31.8 36.5
IOTA. 186.8 261.3 403.3 356.4 387.7 585.2 635.5
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbooks,1970-1989.
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TABLE 3
EXPORTS TO AFRICA
IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
COUNTRY 1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988
BURUNDI 0.8 0.9 1.5 10.6 10.6 3.0 4.2
COMOROS 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.6 1.4 0.5
DJIBOUTI 0.9 15.5 8.5 14.4 19.1 20.7
ETHIOPIA 7.7 32.2 56.7 19.2 20.9 24.5 29.7
KENYA 121.7 210.4 330.7 243.1 247.5 297.1 344.3
LESOTHO
MALAWI 6.6 24.4 43.7 42.0 41.2 48.0 60.9
MAURITIUS 0.8 9.5 15.8 12.5 25.0 30.0 35.3
RUANDA 19.0 0.6 57.6 3.9 4.6 119.6 92.0
SOMALIA 0.7 2.5 1.1 0.5 1.4 1.2 1.5
SWAZI LAND 4.5 3.6 7.3 9.1 13.6 16.4
TANZANIA 44.8 61.3 64.1 14.5 14.9 17.0 22.4
UGANDA 43.5 22.8 35.7 4.3 4.2 4.8 6.0
ZAMBIA 9.8 24.7 53.0 37.9 59.3 57.7 58.8
ZIMBABWE 86.0 113.0 146.4 166.6 209.7 251.4
TOTAL 255.4 481.7 792.9 551.4 620.3 846.7 944.1
SOURCE: IMF, DIRECTION OF TRADE STATISTICS YEARBOOKS,1970- 1989.
TABLE 4
IMPORTS FROM AFRICA 
IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
COUNTRY 1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988
BURUNDI 2.8 3.8 16.6 21.8 24.6 27.9 26.9
COMOROS 3.3 14.3 12.3 14.3 17.6 20.5
DJIBOUTI 30.8 58.3 16.6 18.1 21.7 26
ETHIOPIA 4.8 6.9 12.3 11.8 18.0 19.6 23.4
KENYA 49.4 38.6 75.0 18.2 26.9 158.2 129.7
LESOTHO 2.2 2.2 5.5 6.6
MALAWI 23.8 99.4 192.0 133.1 92.7 116.0 144.9
MAURITIUS 2.2 43.5 111.3 57.3 78.3 100.1 124.7
RUANDA 6.1 14 34.3 44.7 46.1 54.6 50.9
SOMALIA 3.6 11.8 29.7 15.1 18.9 23.5 28.2
SWAZILAND 1.1 2.2 1.1 1.1 2.2 3.3
TANZANIA 48.4 63 19.1 64.9 64.7 77.8 95.4
UGANDA 51.8 67.7 204.9 112.7 122.2 141.6 169.8
ZAMBIA 58.8 88 38.7 158.3 176.0 209.0 270.6
ZIMBABWE 16 45.0 51.7 81.8 92.7 111.9
TOTAL 251.7 487.9 853.7 721.8 785.9 1068 1232.8
SOURCE: IMF, DIRECTION OF TRADE STATISTICS YEARBOOKS,1970-1989.
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TABLE 5
TOTAL EXPORTS
IN MILLIONS Of DOLLARS
MEMBER COUNTRIES 1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988
BURUNDI 24 32 65 112 167 90 128
COMOROS S 9 9 16 20 12 27
DJIBOUTI 11 16 12 14 15 17 49
ETHIOPIA 122 240 425 333 455 396 418
KENYA 305 647 1389 977 1217 961 1072
LESOTHO 6 13 58 20 26 30 36
MALAWI 59 140 281 228 220 277 297
MAURITIUS 69 298 435 440 676 835 998
RUANDA 25 42 112 131 189 113 108
SOMALIA 31 89 133 91 116 124 147
SUA2ILAND 71 199 369 176 267 311 294
TANZANIA 238 372 511 255 343 347 374
UGANDA 245 257 345 410 423 304 328
ZAMBIA 1001 810 1298 784 517 873 1179
ZIMBABWE 344 855 1247 956.1 1000.6 1137 1425
TOTAL 2557 4019 6689 4943 5652 5826 6881
Source: IMF, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS YEARBOOK 1988 AND 
ADB STATISTICS DIVISION ESTIMATES AND COMPUTATIONS.
TOTAL IMPORTS 
IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
TABLE 6
MEMBER COUNTRIES 1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 198S
BURUNDI 22 62 168 189 203 206 206
COMOROS 9 23 29 36 37 52 85
OJIBOUTI 31 146 213 201 221 238 350
ETHIOPIA 173 296 722 993 1102 1150 1609
KENYA 442 987 2587 1462 1650 1755 1994
LESOTHO 32 160 464 376 484 551 661
MALAWI 99 253 439 285 260 296 404
MAURiTIUS 76 332 614 529 684 976 1254
RUANDA 29 99 243 298 348 352 370
SOMALIA 45 155 348 112 124 143 310
SWAZILAND 60 180 53S 281 352 365 372
TAN ZAN1A 319 776 1258 1017 868 923 1139
UGANDA v 172 199 293 327 344 4 77 521
ZAMBIA 559 1138 1339 654 648 816 834
ZIMBABWE 329 689 1370 893.5 986.8 1047 1027
TOT! . 2397 5697 1C625 7654 8312 9348 11136
Source: IMF, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS YEARBOOK 1988 AND 
ADE STATISTICS DIVISION ESTIMATES AND COMPUTATIONS.
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IV.
PTR Member Country Trade Policies
PTA member state trade policies are far from homogeneous. Broadly speaking 
four have relatively broad open general licence provisions and no or 
limited restrictions on (allocation of) foreign exchange for trade 
transactions. These are Mauritius, Lesotho, Swaziland and Djibouti.
Nine - Zimbabwe, Zambia, Uganda, Tanzania, Somalia, Mozambique, Kenya, 
Ethiopia and Comoros - practice detailed import licensing (in some cases 
with limited OGL categories) and foreign exchange allocation. These states 
account for the overwhelming majority of intra-PTA trade. While all are in 
principle in favour of global liberalisation the practical scope for 
implementing it before the 21st Century appears distinctly limited.
Regional trade preferences include PTA "common list" tariff reductions 
except for Lesotho and Swaziland. In addition there are some bilateral 
trade agreements with special credit provisions and a few cases of 
preferential import and/or foreign exchange licence allocations to fellow 
PTA members (and in the case of Zimbabwe to Botswana). The most important 
single trade preference is probably the near free trade arrangements 
between Zimbabwe and Botswana. No significant preferences are given to 
African states outside the region - albeit Lesotho and Swaziland3  ^as well 
as Namibia and Botswana are in a common market arrangement with South 
Africa. With the same exception, none discriminates on a tariff, licensing 
or exchange control basis against regional or other African imports.
All SADCC states operate some form of protection of domestic producers. 
These are - except for Mauritius - not primarily tariff barriers as such. 
Exchange control allocations, import licensing and paper tariffs (including 
certain pseudo sanitary, inspection and regulatory requirements) are much 
more important. Levels and breadth of protection vary with Swaziland and 
Lesotho having very narrow coverage but the other states much broader and - 
on average - higher ones.
All SADCC states operate a variety of export promotion instruments albeit 
with varying degrees of intensity.40
The commonest forms are export retention allowances for exporters - usually 
limited in use to inputs into exporting enterprise production and expansion
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but not solely to export production - and generalised promotion via trade 
fair participation and commercial officers. The export retention schemes 
appear to have a significant positive impact, whether the generalised 
promotion efforts do is open to some doubt except in the cases of 
Mauritius, Kenya and Zimbabwe.
Revolving funds for re-export finance of import content are in operation in 
at least two PTA members41 and are proposed or in the process of creation 
in several more. Of these only the Zimbabwe one appears to have a 
significant impact on exports. In some cases preferential import licensing 
to producers of exports has impact similar (or complementary) to revolving 
funds and export retention schemes.
Significant export deterrents also exist - albeit not as a matter of 
policy. Except for Uganda export taxation is no longer significant in this 
respect. However, regulations on, and documentation of, exports is in 
several cases, as is currency over-valuation - albeit much less so than 
formerly.
On an ad hoc basis provision of infrastructure, employment incentive 
payments and special depreciation allowances probably reduce export costs 
for a number of enterprises in most PTA members. However, the most 
thorough-going example is a prospective member - Botswana.
There do not appear to be any special preferences to, or promotion of, 
regional or other African exports beyond a somewhat higher level of 
participation in national international trade fairs regionally than 
globally. In fact in some cases - e.g. Tanzania - there is (or at least 
was until recently) discrimination against regional exports through 
excluding them from retention allowances and pre-export revolving fund 
allocations.
Investment promotion is not strictu sensu trade policy but as its main 
objectives usually include import substitution (which sometimes builds a 
base for regional exports) and/or export expansion it is a closely related 
set of instruments.
Fiscal incentives are rather diverse among PTA member states. Relatively 
little use is made of tax holidays although loss carry-forward procedures
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are used.*1"’ Initial capital allowances (e.g. 25% initial plus 100% normal 
in Tanzania for approved new or expansion projects) and accelerated 
depreciation (up to 100% in the year of investment in the case of mining 
are common as are duty waivers on imported capital goods.
Formal guaranteed prices are uncommon but import protection - by tariff and 
usually more effectively refraining from issuing licenses - is usual.
These provisions apply to both domestic and foreign investment.
Frame codes in areas such as mineral and hydrocarbon development and 
standard up-to-date Investment Protection Acts with binding international 
arbitration provisions are becoming increasingly common among PTA member 
states. In practice the first and by its nature the second apply to 
foreign investment - a small proportion of which is intra-PTA notably from 
Zimbabwe and to a lesser extent Kenya.
However, in respect to foreign investment the PTA trade preference 
eligibility requirements make regional exports relatively less attractive 
than either domestic market or extra-regional exports. Whether this 
unintended side effect has been significant as enterprise capital flows to 
PTA member states other than for (to date unsuccessful) petroleum 
exploration have been very low over most of the past decade.
Import sourcing is predominately lowest cost known source with a secondary 
objective (usually inconsistent) of longest deferral of payment. These two 
characteristics tend to discriminate against intra-PTA trade (especially if 
lowest cost is interpreted in pre-tax cif terms). There are no specific 
import sourcing preferences for PTA (or broader African) goods beyond the 
preferential tariff rates and on an ad hoc and marginal basis easier import 
licence and foreign exchange allocations.
Exchange rate levels in several PTA member states have in the past 
discriminated heavily against export production and to a lesser extent 
against import substitutes because of their over-valuation. Mozambique, 
Uganda, Tanzania and Somalia are clear cases in point. However, present 
trends are toward medium term "equilibrium" exchange rates with frequent 
adjustments to offset excess inflation relative to trading partners. The 
stress is on medium term as given the general debilitation of many 
enterprises and the long lead time of most investment exports the short 
term supply response to devaluation is usually quite limited. As a result
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parallel markets continue for many products and for foreign exchange even 
if in production cost terms the exchange rate is not seriously over-valued 
i the medium term balance of payments equilibrium sense.
Four policy problems and/or attitudes have a negative impact on regional 
(and even more on non-regional African) trade development:
1. promotion is almost totally of exports and frequently more generous
for extra-regional (hard currency exports);
2. regional import acceptance is usually limited by the target either of 
achieving a maximum hard currency surplus or a limited deficit on 
intra-regional visible trade;
3. there is negligible attention to regional import sourcing as a means
to mutual trade expansion and reduction of extra-regional import 
coefficients;
4. still less is there any general willingness in practice to pay for
regional protection.
PTA Interaction With Sub-Regional and Non-Governmental Groupings
The main problematic intra-regional, inter-organisation relationship of 
PTA, is with SADCC. However, other cases exist in respect to specialised 
multi-purpose groupings (e.g. Kagera Basin Authority) and single programme 
joint endeavours (e.g. Northern and Central Corridors, ESAMI). There is 
nothing intrinsically damaging in the existence of multiple regional 
organisations. Benelux was for some time a closer integration sub-group 
within EEC and present EEC development toward free trade (but not community 
member) zones with EFTA and Eastern Europe represent an evolution in the 
opposite direction - a Europe wide common market with a core economic 
community. Similarly, a number of multi or single purpose groupings of 
European states which are partly or wholly economic in focus, group some or 
all EEC members often together with some non-EEC European states.
As noted above, PTA-SADCC relations prior to the late 1980s were marked by 
a certain amount of assumed competition and rhetorical combat - especially 
from the PTA side. However that barrier to good working relations has been 
substantially eroded over the past few years. Per contra to date, actual 
PTA and SADCC activities have had little overlap and less conflict but the 
potential for somewhat purposeless overlaps and - less clearly - 
programmatic conflicts have increased with recent broadening and re­
orientation of PTA activities.
Complementarity has in fact existed albeit as not on a planned or 
negotiated basis. In the future greater agreed specialisation and division 
of labour would be highly desirable and would increase the efficiency of 
both organisations. One aspect is the accession of Angola, Botswana and 
Namibia (SADCC non-PTA members at present) to PTA so that all PTA 
preferences and sectors were open to all SADCC members. Until that happens 
the Lusaka Declaration and PTA Treaty provisions on trade development do 
conflict as to give non-SADCC states preference over fellow members 
contradicts the Lusaka Declaration and to give non-PTA members equal 
treatment with members is not compatible with the PTA Treaty.
A valuable programmatic division of labour would appear to include:
27
Tariff preferences and standard clearing arrangements solely under PTA 
auspices. Formal liberalisation of import licensing and foreign exchange 
authorisation to be primarily a PTA responsibility but with initial 
bilateral arrangements among two or more SADCC member states coordinated by 
that body. Trade classification and documentation (especially transit 
traffic documentation) and multi-country insurance and travellers cheques 
to be under PTA auspices. In each of these areas there are particularly 
significant economies of scale (regional size) and few advantages in sub­
regionalism.
Counter trade and frame trade agreements providing for mechanisms for 
settling trade imbalances above a pre-agreed level by methods other than 
speedy hard currency settlement are likely initially - and indeed for some 
years - to be bilateral. Therefore, the balance of advantage probably lies 
in PTA playing the coordination and promotion role among its non-SADCC 
members and of SADCC doing so in respect of its members.
Business information system development and trade promotion via fairs, 
subsidies to company based trade missions, etc., should be carried on both 
by PTA and SADCC. There is little danger of conflict and only general 
coordination would appear to be required. At present SADCC's business 
council approach appears more effective than PTA's contact point one.
In the fields of land transport and coordination, SADCC should continue its 
coordinating role for its member states. The PTA should concentrate on 
Central PTA, Horn and Horn-Central PTA transport development on lines 
similar to SATCC's for the SADCC region and - in conjunction with the 
corridor groups - on the routes inland from Kenya and Tanzania.
In respect to sea transport neither grouping has done much but the more 
logical focus would appear to be PTA. In the field of air transport SADCC 
has done some coordination and encouraged national airline internal service 
mergers. The PTA should certainly do the same for its non-SADCC members 
and coordinate with SATCC on region-wide scheduling. Arguably it would 
also be a more appropriate focus for coordination of training and 
maintenance facility development and forum for airline full or partial 
merger.43
Mining and energy should probably be SADCC coordinated because the vast 
majority of mining output and potential and of regional electricity grid
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development lies in that sub-region. A secondary Kenya-Uganda-Rwanda- 
Burundi energy focus within PTA would, however, be desirable.
Human health should remain a PTA area largely because PTA has begun work in 
this sector and SADCC has not. Similarly the extant SADCC Early Warning 
System (in respect to food security) should be expanded to include Kenya 
and perhaps Rwanda and Burundi whose climatic conditions are closely linked 
to those to the South. Whether PTA based Horn and Indian Ocean systems are 
desirable is unclear - no serious attention appears to have been devoted to 
them to date.
In respect to industry, agriculture (including livestock-fisheries- 
forestry) and training, more detailed coordination and division of labour 
would seem to be required. In each case the existing SADCC programmes are 
stronger and can hardly be expected to be wound down or transferred to the 
PTA. In the case of animal disease control probably parallel units would 
be more fruitful given the somewhat different patterns of Horn, Central PTA 
and SADCC endemic, epidemic and potentially pandemic diseases. On the 
other hand, SACAR (the Southern African Centre for Agricultural Research) 
and perhaps the SADCC agricultural research programmes should be extended 
to interested non-SADCC members. Realistically they will not be 
transferred to the PTA in the foreseeable future so a special status with 
links to both organisations might be prudent. A missing sub-programme 
relates to migratory insect pest control. Since several of these - notably 
some varieties of locust - have a PTA wide range (excluding the island 
members), PTA (building on the old locust control organisations based in 
Nairobi) should assume leadership in this field.
In the industrial sector detailed coordination between PTA and SADCC is 
needed to avoid overlap and conflict. While the broad logic of the sector 
indicates that some industries can best be planned and promoted regionally 
this does not apply to all and the existing - if rather fragmentary - SADCC 
programme clearly will not be wound down in the absence of a stronger PTA 
one.
Training turns largely on knowledge of specialist institutions in 
individual states, secondarily on regional initiatives taken by a state 
which has or plans to create a strong national institution and only 
tertiarily on new regional joint institutions. In the first two areas both 
SADCC and PTA can work as the SADCC work will constitute an input into
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broader regional coordination. In the last case the overall logic would be 
for PTA leadership but in practice close links to whichever organisation 
initiated the institution appears more practicable.
External financial mobilisation fairly evidently needs to be done by the 
organisation within whose programme of action the priority project (whether 
national, bi-national or regional falls). SADCC has been extremely 
successful in this field with over $2,500 million pledged in a decade. PTA 
has now begun to seek to organise a parallel initiative - in practice for 
its non-SADCC members.
Mobilisation of regional trade finance - whether for export credit beyond 
90 to 180 days*4 or for the pre-export import content of regional market 
exports is probably analogous to project and institutional finance. The 
existing partially successful SADCC initiatives while sub-regionally 
coordinated feed into nationalfunds so that no disadvantage would arise 
from parallel SADCC and PTA efforts.
The creation of a Regional Trade and Development Bank remains desirable. 
Like tariff preferences, standard clearing, generalised import and foreign 
exchange licence liberalisation, travellers cheques, harmonisation of 
documentation and inter-state insurance, it appears to be an area in which 
the regional is preferable to the sub-regional approach because of 
economies of scale. This suggests a PTA locus. However, both PTA and 
SADCC experience indicate that there is little probability of raising 
adequate external (or hard currency domestic) finance in the immediately 
foreseeable future. A possible alternative would be to lobby the ADB to 
set up an earmarked regional facility to be allocated for regionally 
prioritised projects. In that case, however, the analogy would be to 
general external finance mobilisation and both PTA and SADCC would need to 
be involved.
In strict logic, tourism coordination - largely in relation to promotion 
and market research - could most efficiently be carried out regionally by 
PTA. In practice the existing programme is a somewhat exiguous SADCC one. 
Because of the strong Kenyan, Mauritian and Ethiopian tourist promotion 
units and the perceived rivalries among them and with Malawi, Zimbabwe and 
- to a lesser extent - Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana it is somewhat 
doubtful whether a PTA initiative could successfully be launched in the 
immediate future.
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General policy coordination - e.g. in indicative planning, fiscal policy, 
taxation - requires relatively close relations among the participating 
states. This is an area in which sub-regional groupings such as SADCC have 
advantages and in which it has taken initial steps. Whether the PTA could 
usefully attempt to institute such a dialogue for the Central PTA members 
is unclear; neither the Horn not the Indian Ocean sub-groupings would 
appear to be plausible sub-regions for this purpose.
However, PTA-SADCC relations are not the whole of PTA-Other Regional 
Organisation relations. Another category is special area, multi-purpose
organisations such as the Kagera Development Authority and proposed
Zimbabwe-Mozambique border area joint development. In practice the most 
workable present approach would for these to be coordinated by SADCC in 
respect to its member states and by the PTA in relation to non-SADCC member 
intra-PTA groups. The same holds of single purpose multi-state programmes 
such as the Northern and Central Corridor groups (both in the PTA area of 
responsibility). Research and training institutions notably ESAMI may be 
freestanding (as ESAMI is) or under the aegis of sectoral programmes of the 
initiating grouping. However, some general coordination by PTA at least in 
collecting and disseminating information in all such institutions and 
perhaps in limitating programme overlaps could be useful.
Regional and sub-regional non-governmental bodies are cases for liaison and 
encouragement more than governmental or intra-governmental creation and
coordination. The most directly relevant examples include chambers of
commerce and of industry and regional commercial bank, railways and trade 
union bodies. These can be very useful in creating business attention to, 
and participation in, economic regionalism especially in trade. Non­
economic groupings - e.g. of media and of churches - can also be useful in 
stimulating a sense of community going beyond governments. Neither SADCC 
nor PTA to date has devised a working programme of liaison with such bodies 
albeit SADCC has encouraged international development NGO's to meet 
together in respect to their regional programmes and their general 
promotion of SADCC's overall programme. Both PTA and SADCC (depending on 
the organisation's geographic scope) should seek to articulate functional 
liaison and information exchanges with such bodies and - especially in the 
case of enterprise groups - to consult with them on proposed and ongoing 
programmes.
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VI.
Prospects and Possibilities
The PTA's prospects as of 1990 are encouraging. A relatively firm 
foundation and a perceptable forward dynamic have been achieved. That 
could not have been said as of 1987.
The recent achievements have coincided with increases in the volume of 
intra-PTA trade and an upsurge of both domestic and international belief 
that regional economic cooperation is needed to ensure growth and economic 
restructuring in SSA. These combined with somewhat higher domestic output 
and extra regional export growth rates have created a context more 
favourable to PTA trade and other sectoral activity expansion than at any 
prior date in its history.
A number of largely or wholly non-PTA influencable contextual changes will 
affect the performance of regional integration in Eastern and Southern 
Africa in the 1990s.
The first of these is the level of current war costs. These are likely to 
fall sharply in Southern Africa and less certainly Uganda within the next 
few years and in the Horn before the end of the decade. That alone should 
raise annual regional domestic product growth by 2% and regional trade 
expansion by 3% to 4%.4S>
Additional net external transfers are likely, especially to Zambia and 
Namibia, plus in the context of an end to war (or high levels of civil 
disorder) to Uganda, Ethiopia, Angola4*’ and Somalia as well. Further, PTA 
external finance for regional priority project mobilisation should - on 
SADCC experience - at least somewhat raise net transfers. Against this 
must be set the dangers of donor "aid fatigue" and PTA member state 
"adjustment fatigue" lending to donor endorsed policy abandonment.
Drought could require increased food imports for several SADCC states if 
the 1985-90 relatively good weather period is followed by a cyclical run of 
bad years. However, if this happens in the context of post-war restoration 
of agricultural production in Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia as well as 
return to their homes by most of the refugee populations in Malawi and 
Somalia, then the overall regional food deficit would decline and could be 
bridged by food aid.
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On balance these factors suggest that an annual 6% RDP growth and 10% 
regional trade expansion should be attainable in the 1990s for the PTA 
region.
Four exogenous developments are not likely to have much direct impact on 
SADCC:
1. external terms of trade are unlikely to change much and very unlikely 
to decline as sharply as in the 1980s;
2. the increased net resource transfers to Eastern Europe are likely to 
be largely in commercial and quasi-commercial credit and debt relief 
which are not competitive with most flows to the PTA region.'1' 
Further, restored output growth in Eastern Europe could have a 
significant positive effect on PTA export prices.
3. post-apartheid economic policy changes (other than ending 
destabilisation and aggression) will probably not have a significant 
impact on PTA in the 1990s. In the first place negotiating and 
setting up post-apartheid structures is likely to take years not 
months. In the second, regional development is not likely to be an 
immediate high priority for the first post-apartheid government. 
Finally, establishing mutually beneficial RSA-PTA (or RSA-SADCC) 
relationships is likely to prove difficult and time consuming. For 
South Africa simply to accede to the present PTA grouping on 
conditions like other members would probably swamp the ongoing 
integration process given South Africa's much greater economic size, 
product diversity and overall financial and economic strength;
4. The proposed African Common Market negotiations toward which are due 
to begin in 1990 is unlikely to reach Treaty stage before the middle 
third of the decade or to have a working tariff preference system 
covering a significant range of products before the last third.
Indeed give the extreme weakness of its Western, Central and Northern 
African regional economic integration organisation building blocks 
(absolutely and in comparison to PTA) it may be premature to seek to 
bring it into operation until ECOWAS and ECCA are on a sounder 
operational basis.48
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On balance an annual RDP growth rate of 6% and an annual intra-PTA trade 
expansion of 10% to 12% seem attainable in the 1990s. These are probably 
the minimum levels necessary to maintain governmental commitment to and 
broad support for structural transformation programmes*'’’ and to ensure a 
continuing priority place for economic regionalism within these programmes.
To ensure their attainment progress on twelve basic lines is either 
imperative or highly desirable in the PTA context:
1. continuing the broadening of the "common list" and preferably 
increasing the average level of preferences;
2. liberalising intra-regional trade preferentially by expanding 
regional OGL coverage (absolutely and relative to global OGL 
coverage) and freeing payments for OGL imports from exchange 
controls;
3. harmonisation of regional exchange rates to avert unmanageable trade 
imbalances, severe problems with payments liberalisation and/or 
fiscally unmanageable (and intra-regionally devisive) levels of 
regional export subsidies;
4. establishment of non-conventional trade expansion balancing 
mechanisms whether by counter trade and/or frame agreements with 
annual ceilings on the balances to be settled by hard currency 
payments;
5. expansion of regional trade supporting finance both in respect to
export credit and to securing pre-export import content cover;
6. transport rehabilitation and - especially in the Horn and between it
and the rest of the PTA and in intra-PTA shipping - development both 
to facilitate trade generally and to raise levels of invisible trade 
and transport sector value added;
1. increased inter-state electric power production coordination and
trade both to increase trade and - more basically - to achieve 
capital and unit cost savings allowing enhanced investment in other 
sectors and lower costs for power using products including 
manufactures;
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8. industrial coordination at least to the level of national perspective 
planning harmonisation to avoid creating (or rehabilitating) probably 
unuseable regional excess capacity and preferably including selective 
intervention to establish large scale, linkage and regional trade 
intensive enterprises viable with moderate protection on a multi­
country market basis and significantly reducing the region's 
incremental import/RDP ratio;
9. coordinated external finance mobilisation for regional priority 
projects and institutions for non-SADCC PTA members comparable to the 
levels now achieved by SADCC;
10. broaden both governmental and enterprise perspectives to recognise 
that the basic purpose of exporting is to increase import capacity 
and, therefore, that developing import sourcing from other PTA 
members is as important as building up markets in them;
11. increase the breadth and depth of business (private and public) 
participation in and commitment to, regional trade and production and 
government-business consultation where appropriate, enabling and 
facilitating steps governments could take to this end;
12. restructure PTA to enhance sectoral decentralisation (as e.g. in the 
ongoing constitution of the Clearing House as an institution with its 
own Treaty) and by increasing the member government's role in its 
operations - especially day to day policy and project implementation 
and making proposals for new or modified programmes, policies and 
projects.
None of these developments will occur automatically nor on a "business as
usual" basis. Especially none is by any means beyond the limits of
attainability over the 1990s.
R. H. Green
Lewes
April 1990
iNOTES
1. Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe.
2. Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia (1990), 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
3. It shares this characteristic with the Treaties of the Economic 
Communities of West and of Central Africa and with those of some 
smaller integration groupings such as the (former) East African 
Community. It differs markedly from SADCC's basic document (Arusha 
Declaration) in form and detail but more especially in substance 
since trade is viewed as a means rather than an end and common market 
creation is not included in SADCC's aims.
4. Tanzania, Zaire, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda.
5. Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi.
6. Lesotho, Swaziland, Djibouti, Comoros - the first two because of 
their obligations under the South African Customs Union Arrangements 
and the latter pair because of the fiscal impact of revenue losses 
and the very low anticipated level of their exports within PTA.
7. Rwanda, Burundi.
8. Mozambique.
9. Only Lesotho, Swaziland and Mauritius effectively have free
convertibility in respect to imports and no import licensing. In 
practice - if not in some cases in form - detailed import licensing 
and/or foreign exchange allocation applies in the other twelve.
10. Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, 
Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia.
11. Some invisibles - e.g. especially transit traffic transport charges - 
are not covered.
12. It is denominated in PTA Units of Account (UAPTA) a weighted basket
of member currencies aggregated to a USA $ value.
13. Controls on transfers and capital account transactions could - in the
absence of a common currency - remain with no great medium term harm 
to trade expansion. However, a monetary union without import 
licensing reduction in respect to intra-PTA trade might have very 
limited impact.
14. An alternative route of gradual elimination of foreign exchange and 
import licensing controls on intra-SADCC trade combined with frame 
trade agreements providing that imbalances above some ceiling be 
dealt with by means other than prompt hard currency settlement might 
be more practicable. However, it would be dependent on greater
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stability and a more uniform degree of over (or under) valuation 
among SADCC currencies.
15. The contrast with SADCC/SATCC (Southern African Trade and Transport 
Commission) in these respects is very striking.
16. Another - the East African Management Institute - was successfully 
expanded to become the Eastern and Southern African Management 
Institute. However, it is a self-governing body parallel to rather 
than in close relationship to the PTA.
17. In theory, global export increases are an alternative but given the 
structure, prospects and physical potential of PTA exports (as well 
as the large present trade deficit) that is at best a medium and 
probably a long term approach.
18. Part of the difference in export and import levels relates to CIF 
versus FOB values but there appear also to be discrepancies in 
coverage especially prior to 1987.
19. Rough estimate by author on basis parallel to ECA Southern African 
figure.
20. ibid
21. The contrasting SADCC structure has far more member state involvement 
at all stages and, in particular, separates sectoral units from the 
central secretariat with each state responsible for leadership in one 
or more sectors.
22. SADCC has eschewed trade centrism arguing that coordination of 
enhanced production (including energy, transport, communication and 
specialised knowledge as well as physical goods) was the central goal 
with trade a vital means to validate the production increases.
23. SADCC's relatively higher profile in governmental, media and business 
circles would appear to relate in large part to substantial external 
financial mobilisation capacity which renders a project's acceptance 
on a SADCC sector priority list of substantial value.
24. The clear exception is Mauritius but arguably Swaziland and Lesotho 
do not suffer significant production shortfalls as a result of 
limited import capacity.
25. Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Mozambique.
26. Somalia's official accounts look disastrous but substantially 
underestimate remittances and two-way smuggling.
27. In the Zimbabwe case there is a positive current account balance but
at the expense of capacity expansion and utilisation.
28. If Zambia were to receive substantial net resource transfers it would 
shift to the tight category.
29. Mozambique, Somalia, Tanzania, Zambia and probably Ethiopia and 
Comoros.
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30. The Zambian and Somalian cases are the most critical because the 
defaults include World Bank and IMF obligations which cannot be 
written off or rescheduled and, therefore, present significant 
barriers to restoring net external resource inflows.
31. Mauritius, Djibouti, Comoros, Zimbabwe and - less clearly Kenya are 
exceptions.
32. It is understated because of border area and smuggling transactions. 
However, smuggling to and from non-PTA economies is also large in 
several cases so complete accounts would not raise the share of 
intra-PTA trade (excluding re-exports) above 10%.
33. Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland (despite their SACUA membership) had 
free trade relationships with the Central African Common Market 
Members. Preferential trade arrangements still exist between 
Zimbabwe and Botswana and Malawi (in the Zimbabwe-Botswana case 
substantially free trade except for Zimbabwe quotas on textiles and 
garments).
34. African for this purpose excludes the Republic of South Africa.
South African exports to PTA member states (particularly Lesotho, 
Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Malawi) substantially exceeded intra-PTA 
exports and including Botswana were twice as large. However, RSA 
imports from PTA members and Botswana were (except for Zimbabwe until 
the mid-1980s) quite small absolutely and relative to intra-PTA 
imports.
35. This pattern will be even more striking when Botswana joins the PTA 
as it is Zimbabwe's largest single manufactured goods market and 
potentially its largest stable grain market as well.
36. In practice, without some limits on imbalances required to be settled 
promptly in hard currency few PTA members could contemplate full 
liberalisation of import licence/foreign exchange allocations. 
Similarly without some assurance of increased regional exports 
structural deficit and even potentially structurally balanced 
countries would see little reason to do so.
37. A substantial factor in South African exports to Zambia which in 
general are more expensive than Zimbabwean and a more general factor 
in respect to trade in capital goods.
38. In practice reduction in over-valuation is also needed to permit
relaxation of detailed foreign exchange/import license allocation.
39. Because of their SACUA membership. Presumably similar special
provisions would be needed for Botswana and Namibia on their
accession to PTA.
40. Their intensity seems not to be correlated closely to external 
balance position. Botswana for example has been active in export 
promotion while the Comoros and Djibouti - as well as in practice 
Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi - have not.
41. Zimbabwe, Tanzania.
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42. In practice they also appear to be more efficient judging from 
experience elsewhere because their use requires attaining a profit at 
some point in time as does benefiting from initial or accelerated 
depreciation allowances.
43. The last point is not certain. The most likely mergers of 
international services are Zambia-Mozambique-Tanzania (already 
tentatively agreed) with the potential additions of Swaziland and 
Lesotho, of Zimbabwe-Botswana-Namibia-Angola, of Kenya-Uganda-Rwanda- 
Burundi and (granting significant political climate improvement) of 
Ethiopia-Somalia-Djibouti. The first two group only SADCC members 
and the latter pair only non-SADCC PTA members so that the advantages 
of a single forum and/or catalyst for negotiations is not clearcut.
A region-wide international carrier is clearly not a possibility in 
the foreseeable future given the size and relative strength of the 
Ethiopian, Kenyan and Zimbabwean national airlines.
44. 90 to 180 day trade credit can be handled by national overdraft 
facilities with domestic commercial banks plus swing credit 
arrangements among pairs of central banks.
45. Since 1985 real regional trade expansion has been substantially more 
rapid than GDP growth. While this initial spurt after the 1980-85 
decline may taper off the peace dividend should tend to raise it.
46. In this case debt rescheduling on a basis analogous to Costa Rica or 
Mexico (both higher income economies than Angola) plus renewed access 
to quasi-concessional medium term export finance and increased 
hydrocarbon and mineral investment would be the dominant sources as 
opposed to grants and soft loans for the other countries.
47. However, Germany may well be a significant exception to this 
generalisation if the costs of currency unification and of reducing 
the German Democratic Republic's domestic overhang are as high as now 
projected.
48. The counter argument is that they will not succeed (as envisaged in 
the Final Act of Lagos) even by 2000 so that moving directly to 
continental trade expansion is now appropriate.
49. To date structural adjustment even when relatively successful has 
resulted in very little real per capita household consumption, public 
services provision or domestic savings recovery. The World Bank's 
Long Term Perspective Study's projection of a 4% average GDP growth 
rate to the next Century with next to no overall per capita personal 
consumption recovery after two decades marked by stagnation or 
decline is only consistent on paper. Persons do not live by 
investment and basic services alone and without the personal 
consumption recovery and a 6% growth rate would allow death by 
implosion (loss of morale and commitment) is the probable fate of 
most adjustment and transformation efforts.
